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The subject of this essay is the communicative function of
ideas as a potential determinant of their meanings.
The first proponents· of the sociology of knowledge as a field of explorations
had a double aim. One - voiced in Marx's writings (1967:372-374) and implied in
Max Scheler's and Karl Mannheim's work - was a critical reexamination of the
claim of philosophical idealism that social structures are emanations of ideas
whose inherent evolution constitutes the medium of continuity in history. This
critical aspect of Wissenssoziologie aroused relatively little controversy,
particularly in the United States.! The actual debate, whose end is not yet in
sight, has centered on the principal aim of Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, on
the attempt to spell out the nature of the relationship between ideas and their
existential roots. The literature on the subject may be grouped around three
points of view.
The one which stands out in Mannheim's and his disciple's studies is genetic.
Mannheim adopted with significant modifications the Marxian thesis that the
radius of a person's daily activities (Marx's productive functions) describe the
range of his social awareness within which he forms his conception of himself and
his milieu, in a manner which is consistent with his aspirations. An inspection
will reveal which provinces of the social order have a place in that conception,
and which remain concealed. While Marx's pronouncements on ideologies and class
consciousness were meant to help "change the world" and not merely interpret it,
(1941:84) Mannheim envisaged all ideologies as subjects of non-evaluative and
non-promotional inquiries (1971:107). Their aim was to identify the locus of
the social involvement of which a given ideology is the verbal extension. The
difficulty which such attempts face stems from the multiple positions and
affiliations which individuals maintain in a functionally differentiated society.
Some of these affiliations overlap or conflict and become motives of contradictory
identifications. Fully aware of these difficulties, Mannheim injected the concept
of "intellectual strata" or cognitive systems into his method of procedure. These
systems are elaborated points of view which guide the cognitive process and they
crystallize around the plural seats of major social aspirations. The locus of
these aspirations forms the much discussed existential base. Particular ideologies
are derivations from, or modifications of a given cognitive system, but their
relationship is relatively indeterminate.
A second type of linkage between ideas and social structures is construed as
a quality of congruence between parts of an all-~nclusive system thought of as
an integrated whole of behavioral and cognitive norms (Sorokin, 1943:80, 87-96).
The objective is to identify a problematic item with the system with which it is
consistent. The assumption that social structures are traceable to, or emanate
from normative principles transcends the scope of sociology and is not susceptible
to proof or refutation.
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Finally, the existential basis of ideas is sometimes interpreted functionally,
rather than genetically (Merton, 1964:483). Instead of tracing ideologies back
to their locus of origin they are weighed and categorized on the strength of
their actual or expected consequences. The question here is not what exposures
generate a given thought model, but rather how it affects society. Questions of
this type set the focus for Durkheim's and Radcliffe-Brawn's explanations of rites
and beliefs. In a polarized situation in which several contending groups confront
one another the question is narrowed to who benefits from a given utterance and
whom does it affect adversely. Accordingly, a view is imputed to the faction
which is expected to gain by its circulation, regardless whether its members
actually embrace that view. "The question whether objective truth can be
attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is· a practical
question" (Marx, 1941:82). Tactical considerations can, therefore, blur or
outweigh the interest in the distinction between true or false ideologies,
notably when they are judged in an acute conflict situation. Marxian activists
were the first to have learned that lesson.
The first and last outlined procedures are designed to illuminate ideas as
the dependent pole in a two member relationship. This bipolarity is the product
of an abstraction - the isolation of thought contents from the acts which convey
them - on the assumption that the communication of ideas is external to their
contents and that these are unaffected by the channels through which they reach the
recipients. The principal argument of this essay is that a reexamination of that
assumption opens up a wider scope for the sociological examination of ideas.
Communication is the habitat of mental products; they are given only in a
conveyed form. They are born and conceived as messages to be addressed to real or
fancied audiences. The image which the communicator forms of his audience,
therefore, affects the contents of his message. The practice of addressing
different texts to different audiences does not necessarily evince opportunism
or a lacking point of view. The speaker2 who faces a new type of audience may
well have a new message to convey, and he may adopt new objectives without
abandoning an older one. Once ideas are considered not as entities which
inhabit a realm of timeless meanings, but as channelled expressions, they come
into focus in a four member relationship consisting of (1) the communicator,
including his range of social involvements; (2) his message; (3) the channel
through which it is communicated; and (4) the actual or intended audience. One may
note that the Marx-Scheler-Mannheim paradigm for the sociological identification
of ideas rests on the imputation of item #2 to item #1.
The location of the channel has some bearing on the nature of the message,
depending on whether the communicator is in control of the pathways to his
audience or, if he has only conditional access to them, who the gatekeepers are.
The message varies, moreover, according to whether it is transmitted through
internal or external channels. Internal messages reach a selective and homogeneous
audience, a consenting "ingroup" which shares the speaker's point of view.
External messages are conveyed through 'unrestricted channels which are accessible
to all segments of a heterogeneous audience - the public - 3 including dissenting
outgroups.
The effectiveness of communication depends on whether it elicits the intended
audience response. Public utterances involving divisive issues tend to maximize
their effectiveness by performing three functions: (1) affirm and strengthen the
consensus of the speaker's ingroup; (2) sway uncommitted listeners; and (3) weaken
or undo the accord on which the solidarity of the dissenting outgroup depends. In
other words, messages addressed to a heterogeneous, polarized public tend to perform
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more complex functions than are utterances directed internally to a likeminded
and consenting audience. Divergent definitions of a common situation may,
therefore, originate with the same actor who circulates functionally differentiated
messages, and not necessarily with the dissimilar positions of different
communicators. Anhistorical episode will illustrate the point in quest!on. It
is the case of the rising conservative climate in 18th century Germany.
The original seat of an active traditionalism is traceable to the common
indignation of landed noblemen at the erosion of their vested prerogatives. The
media through which they voiced such sentiments were the neighborly gatherings of
peers and the exchange of letters. It was through these restricted channels that
the wish to resist the levelling policy of the central administration and the
spreading philosophy of the Enlightenment was articulated.
The support for the dissemination of that suspect philosophy came from the
upper ranks of the civil service, at times from the rulers of Prussia, and from a
network of fraternal organizations, including Masonic lodges and the "Moral
Societies," which sprang up throughout the 18th century. It was in these esoteric
gatherings that elements of the middle classes gained contacts with the civil
service and, in some instances, the ruling prince.
The first known attempt of the traditionalists to break out of their
isolation lead to the infiltration by noblemen of some of the more influential
fraternities and the creation of rival sodalities. In both instances the
cultivation of intellectual and moral autonomy and its symbols was replaced by a
new cult of medievalism in ritual and ideology. Through these pseudo-masonic
"orders" the noble participants were able to restore the last channels of
influence with members of the central administration. In Prussia they have
induced the cabinet to arrest the teaching of rationalistic and libertarian views.
These successes were achieved through the use of restricted channels - first the
neighborly gatherings and letter exhanges, and subsequently the ritualistic
sodalities - but the campaign for a favorable public climate could not be launched
without the use of public channels. The disaffected landowners lacked the
experience and skills for addressing effectively public audiences, for they were
in the habit of speaking only to one another, and they were out of touch with the
broader strata of the public.
The literary transmutation of the restorative outlook of the traditionalists
into a printable version with some promise of a public appeal was essentially the
work of a generation of mobile university graduates of lower middle class
background who accepted positions as tutors and secretaries in the households of
titled persons. They were in touch with more than one class, conversant with the
susceptibilities of various segments of the public, and could write. It was
the first generation of the German romantic literary movement which, first
through fiction, later by means of printed discourses in social philosophy created
a climate for a modified form of the traditionalist ideal. These writers fused
concepts to which the Enlightenment gave currency with the reverential treatment
of organically evolved conditions, as opposed to bureaucratic reforms and
"engineered" institutions; they aroused an interest in things secret and
incommunicable, as opposed to the familiar and calculable; and most important,
they juxtaposed an idealized image of the past and its surviving remainders with
the present pictured as a state of decay. The success of this literary appeal to
heterogeneous audiences taught the traditionalists not only to speak a new language
and to communicate new ideas, but also to accept those new ideas and to broaden
their social base to include elements of the newly founded audiences. It was this
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widened social horizon from which the later conservative rally derived its
ideological equipment and its corps of protagonists. The transformation of the
traditionalist point of view could not have been deduced from the background of
those who brought it about or of those who benefited from it. There seems to
be no alternative to the conclusion that the new message was the function of an
encounter with new audiences and of a consequently widened social base.
Although the illustrative case sketched in a nutshell derives from an
historical episode, it is not a unique instance in which the opening of new
channels to new audiences changes the message and self conceptions of the
communicator. The phenomenon occurs on the contemporary scene and it is accessible
to the sociologist. Observations concerning the audience and the pathways through
which it is approached, in addition to the communicator and his message, appear
to be the necessary ingredients of the sociological diagnosis of ideas.
Footnotes
lThe occasional flareup of the controversy over the issue of sociological
relativism versus the autonomy of ideas is peripheral to the focus of this essay.
2The term speaker is used here to denote any agent who addresses a written or
verbal message to an audience. The term "audience" is applied to individuals
or multitudes to whom messages are channelled through any of the available
media - the press, radio, the loudspeaker of the meeting hall, or the conference
room.
3The public is here defined as an unrestricted audience which is divided on a
given issue to which a thought complex under study relates.
4
The documentation of the following case study is contained in Manheim, 1964:
503-515, and 1933:73-145.
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